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BOOK REVIEW
Advocacy Scholarship and Affirmative Action
THE NEW COLOR LINE: How QUOTAS AND PRIVILEGE DESTROY DEMOCRACY.
By Paul Craig Roberts and Lawrence M. Stratton. (Washington, D.C.:
Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1995) Pp. xx, 247. $24.95.
WE WON'T Go BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION. By Charles
R. Lawrence III and Mari J. Matsuda. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1997) Pp. xx, 314. $23.95.
REVIEWED BY CHARLES F. ABERNATHY*
INTRODUCTION
Every revolution is just if measured against the problems it seeks to solve.
Every revolution goes too far if measured against the solutions that it eventually
proposes. Every reform creates a new injustice that makes necessary its own
reform. These truisms do not apply only to the French Revolution and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. So it is also with the civil rights revolution
and affirmative action or quotas.
The difficult part, of course, is knowing what, at any given point in time,
needs changing and what changes go too far and need to be jettisoned. These
books, The New Color Line' by Paul Craig Roberts and Lawrence M. Stratton,
and We Won't Go Back2 by Charles R. Lawrence HI and Mar J. Matsuda,
debate this problem of reform and overreaching in tough, advocacy-oriented
prose. The first argues that racial reform was necessary but has gone too
far-has even become morally self-corrupting-by its adoption of quotas and
affirmative action. The second argues that racial reform was necessary and that
we need more, not less affirmative action, and not only for blacks, but for
women, Asian-Americans, Chicanos, poor people, and generally all "subordi-
nated classes." Its title, therefore, is somewhat misleading, for the authors not
only resist going back, they also wish to push for more quotas and affirmative
action for additional groups.
I wanted to review these books because each in its own way makes the
strongest case for its position, and these two books will probably become the
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B., J.D., LL.M, Harvard University.
Professor Abernathy was a co-founder of the Southern Poverty Law Center and is the author of Cases
and Materials on Civil Rights and Constitutional Litigation (2d ed. 1992).
1. PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE M. STRATTON, THE NEW COLOR LINE: How QUOTAS AND
PRIVILEGE DESTROY DEMOCRACY (1995) [hereinafter THE NEW COLOR LINE].
2. CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MAI J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1997) [hereinafter WE WON'T Go BACK].
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benchmarks for testing ideas and arguments both for and against affirmative
action. Each is very well written, entertaining to read-We Won't Go Back is at
times almost lyrical in its beauty-and scholarly in scope, though not always
scholarly and not intended only for scholarly audiences. Virtually identical in
length, ambition, and historical focus, these books provide complementary
views that together provide a sufficient introduction to the entire current debate.
Their achievements are even more substantial when taken together, and in fact
they must be read together because each alone reflects the usual problem of
advocacy books-it overstates the case, dehumanizes the opposition, and turns
off as many readers as it may convert. To buy and place only one volume on
your coffee table is to make a political statement of what one already thinks; to
read both is to express a desire to think anew.
Despite their decidedly different positions, these books also bear an uncanny
similarity in blueprint that makes reading the pair much more illuminating than
reading one alone. The order and structure of the books are virtually identical.
After setting the stage with personal biographies and a little political orientation
(middle-American classic liberals opposed to privilege and entitlements for The
New Color Line; politically active child of union organizers and well-educated
child of professor and doctor for We Won't Go Back),3 each starts with a
historical view of the problem it discusses (from community goodwill to the rise
of judicial activism; from the Montgomery bus boycott to the anti-affirmative-
action cases of the 1970s and 1980s),4 and each turns to a series of events that
are claimed to constitute the dramatic fall from grace that created a current evil
that must be fought. These events are characteristically precipitated by evil
persons (duplicitous judges; Republican governors).5 Finally, each turns its
attention to the culture wars, 6 broadly noting the faults of their authors' adversar-
ies (the "New Marxists" and "Race Crits"; racial traitors and those who engage in
hate speech).7 The New Color Line bravely risks the condemnation of the currently
ascendant academic view.8 We Won't Go Back supplements unusually hot rhetoric by
offering warm, human vignettes of the lives of affirmative action's beneficiaries.9
Since three of the four authors here are my colleagues at Georgetown University
Law Center,'° I have little interest in promoting a rancorous debate with them.
3. Compare THE NEW COLOR LINE, supra note 1, at i-vii, with WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at ix-xx.
4. Compare ThE NEW COLOR LINm, supra note 1, at 1-50, with WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 11-58.
5. Compare THE NEW COLOR LINE, supra note 1, at 29-61, with WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2,
at 26, 41-42, 57, 166 (referring to Governor Pete Wilson, Republican of California).
6. Cf Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court has
mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.").
7. Compare THE NEW COLOR LINE, supra note 1, at 145-50, 166-70, with WE WON'T Go BACK,
supra note 2, at 12-41, 209-28.
8. See THE NEW COLOR LINE, supra note 1, at 145-47; cf Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law
Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 751, 761 (1996) (statistical study showing Lawrence
and Matsuda are two of most cited law review authors).
9. See, e.g., WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 33-40 (young public interest advocate for liberal
foundation); id. at 245-48 ("single mom" who became an attorney and defends poor people).
10. Charles R. Lawrence III, graduated from Haverford College and Yale Law School and joined the
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Nevertheless, I want to pursue a goal that they will disapprove of: I want to
show that advocacy books such as these commonly impose costs on their
readers, not the least of which is the cost of buying a counterbalancing book that
will help bring out the fuller truth. These books do not claim to be scholarship
in the traditional sense displayed in Randall Kennedy's Race, Crime, and the
Law,11 in which evenhanded investigation and an unprejudged search for solu-
tions determine the scope of the work. The villains here were known and the
solutions chosen before the research began.
My goals are these more ambivalent ones. First, I want to show why these
two books are largely effective advocacy-why they appeal to the reader-and
how their appeal reflects common American ideals about privilege. Second, I
want to show why advocacy books are seldom fully effective and often infuriat-
ingly obvious in a way that alienates thoughtful readers who still have an open
mind, readers who should be the prime audience for the authors' views.
12
Finally, I want to suggest some common problems and fallacies that make it
difficult for advocates and opponents of affirmative action, such as the persons
of goodwill who authored these two books, to reach common ground. 13
I. ADVOCACY THAT WORKS: PRIVILEGE AND THE PRIVILEGED
It is the measure of the Americanization of both teams of authors that they
each aim to kill the same target, "privilege" in public and private life. The
debate is all about who is privileged: each thinks it is the other.
A. THE NEW COLOR LINE AND THE PRIVILEGE OF BEING BLACK
14
Subtitled "How Quotas and Privilege Destroy American Democracy," The
New Color Line sounds some of the notes of the re-emerging communitarian
movement, portraying an American society founded on a conception of the
Georgetown University Law Center (GULC) faculty as a full-time tenured professor after leaving
Stanford Law School's faculty in 1992. He is a past president of the Society of American Law Teachers.
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER BuLLTN 16 (1997-98). Mar J. Matsuda, also a full-time
tenured professor at GULC, joined Lawrence in moving to our faculty from California, leaving the
UCLA law faculty. Id. at 17. Lawrence M. Stratton is an adjunct professor (part time) and teaches one
course per year in legal history. Id. at 203 (listing 266 members of adjunct faculty).
11. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRttE, AND THE LAW (1997).
12. To the extent that the authors' rhetorical devices work on some readers, this review serves to
help those persons become more critical listeners to arguments. Cf Andrew Jay McClurg, The Rhetoric
of Gun Control, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 53 (1992) (discussing the effective and ineffective uses of traditional
rhetorical devices in the gun control debate).
13. Although I consider both pairs of authors to be persons of goodwill, neither pair thinks that of
the other. See THE NEW COLOR LtNE, supra note 1, at 163-70 (criticizing "race crits," such as Matsuda
and Lawrence, for their "assaults on good will"); WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 83-84 (stating
those who oppose affirmative action, as do Roberts and Stratton, are just old-fashioned racists
practicing "race baiting" in a new guise).
14. These books discuss more than preferences by race, as will become clear below. Each establishes
racial preferences as the touchstone of discussion, however, and for ease of presentation I focus on that
topic except where to do so inadequately reflects the authors' views.
1997] 379
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
public good 15 and supported by twin pillars of American law: democratic
processes and equality in governmental treatment of citizens. 16 Ambitious in its
sweep, The New Color Line not only opposes quotas but seeks to show what
missteps in American history made it possible for quotas to take root in an
American society devoted to democracy and equality.
Its chief target is the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,17 a leap of antidemocratic faith that undermined democratic processes and
shifted considerable momentum to the judiciary to ignore popular ideals. 18 But
there are plenty of other targets as well, from federal district court judges who
ran amok after Brown' 9 to federal bureaucrats who subverted democratic compro-
mises justly made in Congress.20 All of these governmental actors misused their
power to erode the most fundamental American precepts-they fought inequal-
ity and privilege, say Roberts and Stratton, by resorting to new inequalities and
new privileges. Old privileges for whites were replaced by new privileges for
blacks, both sets of privileges equally objectionable because based on racial
status, not on individual merit.21
This aspect of The New Color Line is powerful and effective advocacy. The
discussion of the politics of the Brown decision popularizes a little-known
secret in the history of the case. Justice Felix Frankfurter, in a fundamentally
unethical action, created arguments and fed them to the Justice Department
through a favored former clerk, so they would return to the Court as briefs that
would likely appeal to his fellow justices.22 Also disturbing to observers steeped
in the public good is the revelation of political posturing and political use of the
social science profession that led to the publication of Gunnar Myrdal's An
American Dilemma,23 a book that profoundly affected Justice Frankfurter and
the Court in Brown.24 And finally, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion's (EEOC) wilful undermining of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 25 to
promote the use of quotas and statistics in defiance of Congress 26 must cause
discomfort to all those who believe in democratic government. My suspicion is
15. See THE NEW COLOR LINE, supra note 1, at 5-6.
16. See id. at 13-14.
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. See THE NEW COLOR LINE, supra note 1, at 29-50.
19. See id. at 51-59.
20. See id. at 87-102.
21. See, e.g., id. at 135 (discussing how loan programs aiding minorities are privileges because they
cure no prior discrimination against blacks).
22. See id. at 36-50.
23. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AmERIcAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND AMERIcAN DEMOCRACY
(1944).
24. See THE NEW COLOR LnE', supra note 1, at 21-28. The authors see Myrdal's book as the uncited
element in Brown's famous footnote 11, the social science that the Court relied upon but never cited.
See id. at 32 (discussing oral argument questions relating to Myrdal's book and counsel's argument
relying on study cited in footnote 11).
25. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997).
26. See THE NEW COLOR LINE, supra note 1, at 87-102.
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that readers oriented toward public morality, even those who like the result of
these governmental processes, will be embarrassed and feel some shame about
the way in which the goals were accomplished. That is how well this book
works as effective advocacy.
27
The second half of The New Color Line documents the growth of race-based
affirmative action in the aftermath of Brown and the EEOC's reorientation of
Title VII toward statistical balance. There is a collection of sample programs
that can be fairly called quotas, and the reader is asked to see the breadth of the
effort in this direction-hiring quotas, business and contracting quotas, advertis-
ing and modeling quotas, house financing quotas, quotas for university admis-
sions and more. 28 This part of the book also links the growth in quotas to vocal
supporters in academia, especially the "Race Crits" and "Fem Crits" at law
schools. 29 According to Roberts and Stratton, the entire movement, essentially
redistributive and vaguely communistic, reinforces racial stereotyping and dehu-
manizes persons based on their race. 30 The last chapter covers some of the
recent political action in California that rolls back affirmative action3 1-this is
the "back" to which Lawrence and Matsuda, in their title, will not go.
This part of The New Color Line is also compelling advocacy. It works by
drawing on the reader's reservoir of traditional, liberal American values, such as
fair play and freedom of conscience and speech. A few fringe actors go a long
way in helping the argument: Lani Guinier with her penchant for assuming the
power to announce who is "authentically" black;32 Leonard Jeffries, Jr., and his
antics at CCNY;33 and a few players known only to academics who suggest that
all sex is rape34 and that integration is a tool of white domination.35
All argument is effective or not in the context of widely shared values, and
27. I include these points together here to demonstrate how well the book draws on fundamental,
shared values to make itself persuasive. At the same time, I would judge that not all these points are of
equal value. That institutions promote research to popularize topics, as disclosed in the discussion of
AN AMERICAN DILEMMA, supra note 23, seems ordinary, and to expect the world to behave contrarily
would be naive. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that the urge to misuse social science can explode
in one's face, and there can be no complaint when that finally happens. See, e.g., Mark G. Yudoff,
School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court,
42 LAW & CorTEMP. PROBS. 57, 70 (1978) (observing that the consensus among social scientists is that
the data relied on in Brown were defective).
28. See THE NEW COLOR LtNE, supra note 1, at 163-70.
29. See id. at 145-61. For those outside academia needing background on these terms, see Mark V.
Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515 (1991).
30. See THE NEW COLOR LINE, supra note 1, at 163-70.
31. See id. at 170-77 (discussing Governor Wilson's objection to quotas).
32. See id. at 148.
33. See id. at 154-55 (noting Jeffries considers whites "fundamentally materialistic, greedy, and
intent on domination," while blacks are "essentially humanistic and communal").
34. See id. at 166 (discussing Andrea Dworkin's view that consensual heterosexual marital sex is
rape).
35. See id. at 169 (discussing Gary Peller's view that integration reflects "the ultimate racism" by
subsuming black culture). Integration, however, is also a strange construct. After Peller was hired on the
GULC faculty, one colleague announced that having read his work, it was a good thing that we had
further integrated our faculty by hiring a black man. This colleague is white.
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this part of the Roberts-Stratton book appeals by viscerally pushing the reader to
think of morality as it is deeply shared by most Americans. Roberts and Stratton feel
they have an argument to make precisely because they believe that these values are
widely and deeply shared-that they are democratic values-in our society.
The privileged to whom Roberts and Stratton refer, therefore, are those who
receive special benefits because of the irrelevant factor of their race, and in
modem American society those are blacks and others benefitted by quotas and
other affirmative action.3 6 To bestow privilege in this way is wrong because
both those harmed and those benefitted are judged by the same equally irrel-
evant factor of race rather than by their underlying merit. 37 The argument seeks
to persuade by forcing the quota advocate to confront a previously popularized
value, the equality that results when race is extracted from decisionmaking; 38 it
also works because so many modem Americans actually share this value.3 9
B. WE WON'T GO BACK AND THE PRIVILEGE OF BEING WHITE
(AND RICH AND MORE)
For the authors of We Won't Go Back,4° it is a different world out there, one in
which privilege belongs to an array of persons sitting opposite persons of
color.4 The Roberts-Stratton view of a community in which all persons seek the
common good strikes Lawrence and Matsuda as naive idealism. Referring to
sixteenth-century writings that first spoke of a new race of Americans, separate
from their European forebears and interested in the common good, Lawrence
and Matsuda curtly reply: "[I]f a new race called Americans had indeed arisen
[from among European immigrants], it was white. ' ,4 2 Meritocracy does not
exist either: legacies (children of alumni) are regularly admitted to universities
despite their lack of merit, and professions fill their ranks based on inside
contacts, not merit.4 3 The hegemony of insiders is so great that only affirmative
counter-privileges--offsetting privileges-can break the existing stranglehold
of the existing privileged."4
36. Chapter 9, which makes this argument most directly, is entitled "The Proliferation of Privilege."
Id. at 127.
37. This is the same argument made by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in his famous "I Have a Dream"
speech. See HENRY HAMPTON & STEVE FAYER, VOICES OF FREEDoM: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM THE 1950s THROUGH THE 1980S 167 (quoting text of speech).
38. See id.
39. See PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & EDWARD G. CARMiNES, REACHING BEYOND RACE, passim (1997)
(discussing the wide consensus among whites on antidiscrimination as a positive value).
40. Lawrence and Matsuda state that they are maintaining their separate voices, and in line with
previous statements, they consider individual voice important. WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at xv.
The individual chapters are not labeled with the author's name, however, and therefore in an abundance
of caution I attribute all statements to the authors collectively unless there appears to be a reason to
divide them and a strong indication of a chapter's individual author.
41. See, e.g., id. at 222.
42. Id. at 210.
43. See id. at 91-101, 185-86.
44. This is equally true of sex discrimination against women. See id. at 151-67.
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The counter-privileges advocated by Lawrence and Matsuda are affirmative
action programs, quotas.45 And because the hegemony is broad and pervasive,
the affirmative action must be similarly broad, offsetting "discrimination along
all axes,",4 6 providing benefits for principally blacks, women, certain other
ethnic groups, homosexuals (if gays and lesbians want it), disabled persons, and
poor people.4 7 The authors do not argue for benefits for the unqualified, though
they frankly note that qualifications are difficult to measure and are themselves
often based on the assumptions and viewpoint of the historically privileged. 8
Affirmative action, therefore, is a form of compensation, or reparation, that
makes right grievous and ongoing wrongs. 49 Not to be too narrow, however, We
Won't Go Back provides alternative justifications for affirmative action. It may
be appropriate to accomplish some unrelated social goals, such as improving
community contacts between police and the communities whose trust they must
win, or improving the provision of medical services to underserved communi-
ties.5° Moreover, affirmative action is also good because it can be a "special
treat": sometimes you just get one for no reason at all.51
With exceptions noted below, We Won't Go Back works as effective advocacy
because it appeals to our sense that persons should not suffer for losses which
were not of their own making.52 The victim of a battery deserves compensation
for harms deliberately directed at her, an automobile accident victim deserves
compensation for harms carelessly directed at her, and even a flood victim
deserves compensation-through socialized structures such as insurance-for
harm visited on her without reason or plan. The third class is important, for the
authors realize that not everyone will agree that blacks (and others benefitted by
affirmative action) are without responsibility for their condition, so they care-
fully and sometimes subtly construct opportunities for the reader to overcome
stereotypes of various minority groups. They sprinkle vignettes of the lives of
affirmative action beneficiaries throughout the book, humanizing such persons
so that the reader dare not think of faceless, stereotyped "others" 53 who are
black, women, or poor. The authors' parents and siblings also make regular
45. Id. at 182. Those who benefit from affirmative action are admitted to receive a "moderate level
of privilege." Id. Neither book draws a distinction between "affirmative action" and "quotas." Both
treat the relevant issue as one of privileges bestowed; with one important reservation noted below, see
infra Part MIIA1, I discuss the issues in the context acknowledged by the authors.
46. WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 251.
47. See id. at 249-69.
48. See id. at 91-119.
49. See id. at 233.
50. See id. at 184, 200, 251-55.
51. Id. at 102.
52. Cf. Steven L. Grover, Predicting the Perceived Fairness of Parental Leave Policies, 76 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 247, 252 (1991) (citing studies and research showing that persons will perceive
greater justice in situations in which reparation is given to a "recipient [not] responsible for initiating a
need").
53. WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 127. Lawrence and Matsuda regularly refer to "others" to
define persons who lack privilege and would benefit by affirmative action.
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appearances, and they are accurately presented as accomplished, sensitive persons of
color, not lazy know-nothings lacking self-respect and goals in life.54 The reader can
no longer pigeonhole all blacks as either involuntary victims (deserving of aid) or
volitional nonvictims (undeserving of aid because they brought their problems on
themselves). Instead there is a much more dynamic social construct at work in which
intent of the racist and free will of the black person are only occasional elements.55
The central and self-admitted "scary" thesis of We Won't Go Back, the
extension of quotas to so many groups and the observation that quotas are
"redistributive, ' ' 56 relies on an appeal to widely shared values, not merely
leftist politics. If compensation is just, it is just for all who have suffered loss,
and that means more than simply blacks. Though they never cite the concept by
name, their approach relies implicitly on Justice Thurgood Marshall's famous
and intuitively appealing "sliding scale," 57 so that the most harmed (blacks)
would receive "affirmative action plus," while other less-victimized groups
would receive only ordinary affirmative action58 or none at all if they so
choose. 59 Though the sheer size of the Big Tent creates some awkward mo-
ments, I suspect that this argument appeals to many for the same reasons that the
Democratic Party's Big Tent appeals to many American voters: it spreads the benefits
to be realized from affirmative action to many persons. It draws support for the same
two reasons that middle-class entitlement programs draw support: many can see
themselves as at least potential beneficiaries and as deserving of the help,6° while
many others simply see that members of some of these groups deserve help or justice.
II. THE LIMITS OF ADVOCACY SCHOLARSHIP
I have enjoyed my colleagues' books and have learned much from them.
Advocacy books have their place. Nevertheless, these books-the best of their
genre-also demonstrate the limits of "advocacy scholarship." As rhetorical
adventures go, advocacy books often share three defects: romanticization of the
self, demonization (or unfair denigration) of opponents, and myopia of the heart
(an inability to see oneself as seen by others). These are related defects that go
to an author's intellectual empathy, an essential openness to the views of others.
54. See, e.g., id. at xviii (discussing Lawrence's professional family); id. at ix-xi (discussing
Matsuda's activist parents and disabled-veteran grandparent).
55. See id. at x-xi, 77, 225. Lawrence remarks with great understatement, "Our [black] culture, our
identity, is not entirely of our own making." Id. at 225.
56. Id. at 273.
57. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 119-22 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing the level of scrutiny in an equal protection case should vary according to factors
such as the character of the class affected, the importance of the governmental benefit/harm to those
affected, and the asserted state interests); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 517-29 (1970)
(Marshall, J. dissenting) (same).
58. WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 192.
59. Id. at 258-59. The authors never define "affirmative action plus." It is a problem for their thesis,
as discussed below. See infra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
60. See Grover, supra note 52, at 248 (citing studies establishing that "an egocentric bias leads
people to evaluate resource distribution schemes that benefit themselves as fair").
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A. ROMANTICIZING THE SELF
I assume that everyone romanticizes or puffs himself, his friends, his world,
but it is a serious problem for advocacy books and an especially serious
problem for advocacy books about race. This is because the romanticization of
the self is a real or potential manifestation of one's own insularity and narrow-
mindedness, two universal character traits that permit residual race conscious-
ness to survive even among persons of goodwill, such as these authors.
We Won't Go Back repeatedly offers romanticized depictions of the authors'
selves,6 1 families, 62 and ethnic communities.63 Parents are idealized-what's
new?-but so are their stories, which are accepted uncritically and turned into
race-based and class-based parables. One author's mother admits to her child
that she stole peanut butter from her employer's refrigerator, but only because
she was not paid enough, or only "because they did not give me enough to
eat." 64 In one respect this romanticizing is not only necessary, but a core
element in accomplishing three important goals set by the authors: overturning
stereotypes about persons of their backgrounds who benefit from affirmative
action;65 demonstrating that persons of their backgrounds are in fact capable,
moral, and hard-working; 66 and popularizing the message that minority progress
can and should be initiated and controlled by minority communities. 67 Present-
ing some very accomplished siblings and parents helps those causes, but the
authors' persistent readiness to excuse bad conduct by romanticizing the mo-
tives of self, family, and community eventually becomes unrealistic. 68 More-
61. One author, for example, trumpets straight-A grades in law school and claims never to have held
a job that he or she was "unqualified for." WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 91. But see infra notes
166-69 and accompanying text (apparently using "qualifications" to mean "minimal qualifications").
62. One author describes regular meetings between a father and other well-known black profession-
als in which conversations focused on "honest and rigorous analysis and criticism," never gossip or
fanciful conversation. WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 132-33. Siblings include a published
sociologist, id. at 284 n.2, and a "brilliant teacher," id. at 225, not your ordinary American working
family.
63. People of color are regularly depicted as working "harder than anyone else." Id. at 38. Civil
disturbances and burnings by blacks are just, and merely "the voice of the unheard." Id. at 17 (quoting
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.). Black students who shout down white students at a public meeting are not
responsible for their conduct, for they are acting justly in the context. Id. at 223-24.
64. Id. at xvii-xix.
65. See id. at 7.
66. See, e.g., id. at 38.
67. See id. at 19-20, 30-31, 212.
68. Lawrence has an additional problem of persuasion that is created by his attempt simultaneously
to show that he comes from an accomplished family and that his opponents, not himself, are the
privileged of society. Some white persons may find it difficult to conceive that the grandson of an
Episcopal priest, son of a doctor, son and sibling of other professionals, and spouse of a law professor,
who is himself a law professor, is a victim in'this society. I am somewhat inclined toward Lawrence's
view, on the knowledge that even professional blacks receive no immunity from racism, but the very
ambitious agenda in presenting blacks as consistently accomplished carries with it the potential for loss
of credibility. See id. at 223 (claiming black students who shout down a white professor should not be
held responsible for their acts; black students who shout down white students in discussion with famous
black filmmaker cannot be held responsible for their acts, even though filmmaker himself thought
dialogue was appropriate and nonracist).
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over, the self-centeredness at the heart of romanticization of the self comes
uncomfortably close to the same human urges that promote racism, sexism, and
the other ills that these authors decry. The art of puffing oneself and one's
cohorts carries the implicit message that persons outside the circle are "others,"
as alien to Lawrence and Matsuda as minorities are to majority society. 69
Romanticizing the self is not an immediately apparent problem for The New
Color Line because the authors consciously appeal to an ecumenical vision of
American society that is egalitarian, selfless, and oriented toward full demo-
cratic participation by the entire community. By implication, the authors present
themselves as objective, evenhanded, and civic-minded persons. One might
argue that this is itself a romanticization of the self,70 but there are some
indications that more overtly romanticized views have occasionally crept into
the text. Roberts tries to establish his bona fides on racial sensitivity by telling
the story of sneaking a dark-skinned Arab friend into movie theaters by wrap-
ping his head in a turban, thereby avoiding a movie operator's otherwise certain
efforts to exclude the Arab friend as a perceived black person.7 The point
appears to be that Roberts has always known what racism is and has success-
fully gamed the system in order to resist its effects. He also notes that many
whites in his hometown "formed lifelong relationships with black household
employees, who became de facto members of the families."' 72 It is such
romanticized visions of friendly racial interaction that must drive Lawrence and
Matsuda crazy, and such stories are equally unlikely to persuade many fence-
sitters of the author's racial sensitivity.
The romanticization of self, friends, and one's own community is an objection-
able rhetorical device for two reasons. First, it asks the reader to believe that an
argument is worthy because it is made by worthy persons, not because it has
intrinsic merit.73 An idea may come from any source, and knowing that source
69. See id. at 33. Lawrence, for example, un-self-consciously refers to the fact that he always
"root[s] for the team" with black players. See id. at 67. He states that the coaches he admires are "race
men," which "has nothing to do with not liking white folks. It has a lot to do with loving black folks
and yourself." Id. at 68. Despite this circle-closing justification for his feelings, his coauthor, in the
succeeding chapter, criticizes white-dominated law firms for "tend[ing] to look for someone like
themselves." Id. at 101.
70. See KENNEDY, supra note 11, at 7 (noting that advocates of a color-blind Federal Constitution
may actually be more excited about black crime than all crime).
71. THE NEW COLOR LiNE, supra note 1, at ii.
72. See id.
73. When I say "intrinsic," I include context-that is, time and place, but mean to divide that
context from the individual speaker's public persona. Lawrence and Matsuda might object that there is
no such division. See WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at ix-xi (noting that all racial consciousness is
contextual); id. at xix (rejecting the "notion that there is one universal authority"). I agree to a certain
extent, but my point is subtler. Although one context (such as race) plays a substantial role in
determining one's personality, competing contexts (respect for education, friends) as well as individual
personality traits (shyness, aggressiveness) affect the way in which all factors are blended to make a
whole person as he or she is perceived by self and others. See id. at xi (discussing white racist who
agreed to vote for black mayoral candidate because of his views on education). Lawrence and Matsuda
do an excellent job, especially in some of their vignettes, of breaking down stereotypes and persuading
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may prejudice our views but ultimately tells us little or nothing about the
injustice of the position.74 Second, romanticized depictions are essentially false
depictions. Stealing does not always occur because people have not been paid
adequately as nannies or housekeepers,75 and lifelong friendships with maids
establish few bonds of equality across racial lines. Successful public policy
must be based on something more than a scene from a John Wayne movie or a
romance novel.
B. DENIGRATION OF OPPONENTS
Denigration of opponents, as seen in these books, falls into two rhetorical
subcamps: guilt by association and personal vilification. These are fine lines
because sometimes one's opponent is a rat and saying so promotes the search
for a greater truth. How is this fine line tread in The New Color Line and We
Won't Go Back?
1. Charges of "Marxism" and Counter-charges of "Red-Baiting"
The attempt to caricature an opponent by linking his position with widely
despised others has a long, ignoble, and often very successful history.7 6 Though
the Cold War has at least temporarily ended, communism and virulent anticom-
munism seem like good anchors to tie around an opponent's neck, so we see
The New Color Line linking affirmative action to "Marxism, ' 77 while We Won't
Go Back returns the compliment with a charge of "red-baiting" ' 78 aimed at
those who link affirmative action with communism. Guilt by association is only
unfair when there is no pertinent association, and so the question is whether
there is such an association underlying the charges made here.
When The New Color Line charges that affirmative action is a tool of
potential opponents of affirmative action that those who like affirmative action are complex persons
worthy of support and admiration. But the romanticization of family and friends is intended to do
something more, to induce readers to like affirmative action because they perceive its adherents as
likable.
74. Goodwill by association is the sibling of guilt by association. Recent newspaper stories reported
that Sweden had sterilized many persons during the mid-twentieth century using laws modeled on those
in Nazi Germany. Dan Balz, Sweden Sterilized Thousands of 'Useless' Citizens for Decades, WASH.
POST, Aug. 29, 1997, at Al. Yet similar laws were also in force, with Supreme Court approval, in the
United States. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Associating the Swedish practice with American
standards during the time does not make it more just, and associating it with Nazi practices makes it no
worse.
75. As Randall Kennedy has recently shown in his brilliantly conceived and executed RACE, CRIME,
AND THE LAW, supra note 11, at 12-21, there is a perverse popular association of blacks and crime, but
fighting that battle can only be made more difficult if one seeks to prove that all blacks are blameless
for all criminal acts.
76. See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act 3, sc. 2 (speech by Marc Antony linking
Brutus to the deceased Caesar).
77. See THE NEW COLOR LINE, supra note 1, at 145 (referring to advocates of affirmative action as
"The New Marxists" in the title for chapter 10); id. at 146 (tying such advocates to the old "Soviet
Union").
78. See WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 216 (authors' proposal is opposed by "Red baiters").
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Marxism, there is some historical fire to the label but also an essential present
truth. Legal rules with affirmative action implications have redistributive conse-
quences when they are implemented. 79 Lawrence and Matsuda themselves often
appreciatively describe affirmative action as "redistributive, '' 80 and are very
aware that such an admission makes their proposals sound "scary.' Espe-
cially when pressed toward affirmative action for poor workers, one of their
expanded topics for more quotas, the position in We Won't Go Back becomes
classically Marxist by redistributing according to need.
82
It is difficult to see, therefore, that the charge of a link between affirmative
action and Marxism is "red-baiting.", 83 In his history of the critical legal studies
movement, Professor Mark V. Tushnet notes a linkage between "crits" and
leftist-oriented parents, a link strong enough for him to call his colleagues, with
an apparent smile, "red diaper babies." 84 His point is not that "crits" are born
disloyal, but that quite often the views of parents are passed through to children,
though perhaps diluted. When Roberts and Stratton attack the "crits" and their
offshoots' association with affirmative action,85 they make even less of a
familial connection. Their point is true: affirmative action is redistributional,
known to be so, and thus has socialist elements.86
79. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 n.14 (1976).
80. WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 83, 251-53, 273.
81. Id. at 273.
82. KARL MARX, CRmQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAmmE 10 (New York Int'l Publishers 1938) (1875)
("to each according his to needs").
83. Those who remember the early days of the black civil rights movement know of its actual
connection to leftist causes, see, e.g., Herndon v. Lowery, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (noting black liberation
and communist organizing efforts in the South), and the much wider attempt to tie the cause to the
Soviet Union and Marxist totalitarianism. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE
KING YEARS, 1954-63, at 468-69 (1988) (discussing FBI report attempting to link Rev. Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr. with communists); id. at 565 (same); id. at 596 (same); id. at 853 (reporting that
President John F. Kennedy asked King to cease communications with persons whose names might
indirectly link King to communism). This historical knowledge is what makes Lawrence and Matsuda
sensitive to charges of Marxism, and it is the apparent impetus for their counter-charge of red-baiting.
By standing behind redistributional policies and aligning themselves with "critical" academic views,
the authors of We Won't Go Back show interests that most persons would characterize as leftist. See WE
WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 133; see also infra note 84. Their only point in alleging "red
baiting," therefore, must be that they are not related to the Russian brand of totalitarian Marxism that
flourished in the U.S.S.R.
84. See Tushnet, supra note 29, at 1516 (stating that "crits" represent less a movement than a
"political location for a group of people on the Left" who believe in common that "law is politics";
many adherents' parents were leftists, and their children appear to have inherited a diluted version of
their views). In a revealing parallel to Tushnet's remark about "red diaper babies," Matsuda refers to
her parent's union-organizing and civil rights activities and labels herself and siblings as "picket-line
babies." WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at ix.
85. THE NEW COLOR LINE, supra note 1, at 146-48.
86. Rather than call opponents red-baiters, supporters of affirmative action might point out that, as in
secondary education and social security, socialization of costs and redistribution of benefits are positive
goods. In fact, that appears to be the Lawrence-Matsuda argument. See WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note
2, at 185-86 (suggesting that universities should take an active role in redistributing benefits of
American society). Charges of red-baiting obscure the needed discussion about what to socialize and
what to leave to private choice. See infra Part IIAI.
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2. "Handkerchief Heads," "Antiunion Propagandists," and Paid Outsiders
Surprisingly, there seems to be much more serious name-calling going on in
We Won't Go Back than in its counterpart on the right.87 Aside from the
problematic references to Marxists noted above, The New Color Line treats
opponents as seriously mistaken and even morally objectionable, but never is
there a schoolyard name yelled out.88 We Won't Go Back, on the other hand,
indulges in so much radical-chic labeling that by the end I almost expected to
see a 1968-style reference to "Chiang Kai-shek and the running dogs of
capitalist imperialism.", 89 A Supreme Court Justice is said to be "a 'handker-
chief head' ,,90 and "a chicken-and-biscuit-eating Uncle Tom." 91 While these
slurs against Justice Clarence Thomas are quoted as the words of others,
Lawrence reports them-repeatedly-with the same mixture of glee and anger
common in epithet calling. Finally, in the author's own words, Justice Thomas
is lashed for the "extremity of his betrayal" of blacks.92 Were these the only
examples, perhaps the reader could be persuaded that the slurs were necessary
to the story line, as Hollywood writers usually say about (female) nudity in
movies, but similar denigration of opponents flavors the entire book. Opponents
87. The surprise arises not because of the stereotype that conservatives are more epithet-prone than
others, but because no epithets were expected from the Lawrence-Matsuda team. See Charles R.
Lawrence III, If He Hollers, Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431,
474-76 (arguing regulation of racial epithets constitutionally permissible and desirable); Mar J.
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320,
2379 (1989) (discussing need for sensitivity to harm caused by epithets). In line with the antisubordina-
tion thesis of the authors, see infra note 89, it may be true that their antiepithet rule applies only to
speech directed against subordinated groups, leaving the subordinated free to use epithets against
others. See id. Nevertheless, some of the epithets quoted below are directed at other blacks, thus placing
them in violation of the authors' own rule. See infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
88. But see infra note 91 and accompanying text.
89. Matsuda at one point declares in almost self-caricature of radicalspeak that "[w]e oppose
subordination on all axes." WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 251. "Subordination" and "antisubor-
dination" are repeatedly used concepts in the authors' theoretical justification for affirmative action,
e.g., id. at 186, though the terms are never defined. Moreover, given that the authors intend to promote
affirmative action for blacks, women, and disabled persons, see infra text accompanying notes 140-43,
148-54, it is difficult to infer what "subordinated" really means. Disabled persons, for example, are
pictured as the close relatives and partners of powerful people, such as President George Bush, or
powerful people themselves, such as Senator Robert Dole. See WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at
292 n.14. If antisubordination is the goal of affirmative action, it is difficult to understand why those in
the circle of the powerful should be beneficiaries of affirmative action. I assume, therefore, that
subordination is a complex term.
90. WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 135. Before Deion Sanders made "do-rags" (cloths to
cover one's hairdo) popular among highly paid athletes, the wearing of a handkerchief on the head was
often seen among lowly paid unskilled workers and farmhands, frequently African-Americans.
91. Id. Roberts and Stratton take on Justice Thurgood Marshall in much the same way that Lawrence
and Matsuda take on Justice Thomas, for the purpose of belittling ideas by belittling the persons who
espouse them. See THE NEW COLOR LINE, supra note 1, at 34 (discussing Judge Henry Friendly's letter
confiding to Justice Frankfurter that then-judge Marshall was inadequate for his job). But there is no
epithet. Cf. id. at 130-32 (criticizing justices of the same race as authors, again without epithet).
92. See WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 139. Dinesh D'Souza and former Secretary William
Bennett, also opponents of affirmative action, fare somewhat better than Justice Thomas; they are
engaged only in "silly hyperbole and ... pseudo-intellectual assault." Id. at 107.
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who talk about multiculturalism, for example, are a part of a "copout at least
and a deliberate reinvigoration of white supremacy at worst," ' 93 while other
opponents are "[a]ntiunion propagandists.", 94 The name-calling and innuendo
degrade at times to opinionated inconsistency: one vignette lauds a young
Puerto Rican lawyer who works for the Ford foundation directing outsiders'
money into admired community projects, yet a hated student journal that has
received Ford Foundation money is described as an "externally funded right-
",95wing newspaper ....
This disturbing proclivity for name-calling and mudslinging characterizes
much advocacy scholarship. The authors of such a work can become so fully
convinced of the justice of their position that their opponents become dehuman-
ized. The surprise in finding such attitudes in the Lawrence-Matsuda work is
that these professors at other points in their book sound genuinely open invita-
tions to dialogue,96 and when criticized previously for their harsh words, they
have responded with shock that their book was not received as the "religious
and ethical[]" book that "affirms the human family" they envisioned.97 The
tragedy of the use of these slurs and denigrations is that they add nothing
to-and even subtract from-the power of the authors' stories. The way Mat-
suda describes the interracial neighborhood of her childhood shows a warmth
and sensitivity for others and their complex racial feelings that cannot be
misunderstood; 98 Lawrence's description of friends who aided his youthful
boycotts is similarly moving. 99 The vignettes about Anthony Romero, whose
full-grown father was called "Chico" in his son's presence at work,'0° and
Bernadette Gross, the self-made female carpenter who sees failure only among
women who allow "unfairness [to] consume[] them,"' '° present compelling
93. Id. at 180.
94. Id. at 107. Those who aspire to a liberal ideal of a color-blind society are pursuing the "old-time
politics of race-baiting," while politicians who oppose immigration and social programs are similarly
racist. Id. at 84.
95. Id. at 219. Lawrence and Matsuda also use "McCarthyism" as a familiar refrain. Id. Public
universities are "supported disproportionately by working people's taxes." Id. at 42. There is also a
repetitious allegation that opponents-never the authors-are engaged in rhetorical games. See, e.g., id.
at 49 (noting opponents' arguments are "rhetorical, not factual"); id. at 74 (noting opponents rely on
"rhetorical ruse").
96. See, e.g., id. at iii, 277.
97. See Charles R. Lawrence I & Man J. Matsuda, Misleading Rhetoric Mars the Affirmative
Action Debate, WASH. TIMEs, June 2, 1997, at A16 (letter to the editor responding to book review of
their work by Stratton).
98. WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at x-xi.
99. Id. at xiv. Lawrence's writing reaches a moving, inspiring zenith when he discloses his personal
feelings about racially conscious experiences. See, e.g., id. at 140 (describing being forced to read Little
Black Sambo in preschool where he was the only black student). In one of these passages Lawrence
empathizes with Justice Thomas who, when young, was called "America's Blackest Child," deemed by
Lawrence a "racial slur" made by other black students. Id. at 140-41. There is never a hint of
denigration in these powerful and moving passages, and that demonstrates that the practice is unneces-
sary to Lawrence's work.
100. Id. at 36.
101. Id. at 147.
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stories that put to lie the assumption that one can only elevate oneself by
personally putting down others.
I suspect that the radical jargon in We Won't Go Back is just an excessive
permutation of The New Color Line's charge of Marxism. There is a certain
need in advocacy books to assume not just the arguments, but also the stance of
the advocate-to swagger a bit, to establish one's bona fides with those already
converted to one's side. 10 2 This is analogous to speeches at a political gathering,
where Republicans feel it necessary to extol the interests of the "unborn" while
Democrats praise teachers' unions. Yet every politician knows, as should these
authors, that the act of solidifying one's base runs the risk of alienating
others.1 0 3 The other possibility is that advocacy authors simply have so little
detachment that they cannot see themselves and their arguments as others will
see them.
C. MYOPIA OF THE HEAD AND HEART
Both The New Color Line and We Won't Go Back suffer from intellectual
myopia symptomatic of advocacy books, for as substantial as their contributions
are, they sometimes show no awareness of their weaknesses as seen by others.
The authors thus miss the opportunity to clarify their thoughts, to anticipate
criticism, or to make their discussions more sophisticated. This weakness is
very visible in these books' discussions of privilege. Not only does each team
see the other as privileged, 1° 4 each appears unable to even comprehend that
others could perceive them as privileged. 105
In The New Color Line the privileged are minorities who benefit from
affirmative action programs, not the authors (a graduate of an "elite engineering
school" who served as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury under President
Ronald Reagan 1° 6 and the son of a college president who graduated from the
102. The Lawrence-Matsuda book stakes out a position so convincingly "1968" that even old
liberal, Farmer-Labor Party unionist Hubert Humphrey is deemed an unregenerate rightist on the issue
of affirmative action. Id. at 15.
103. Saying something like "[w]e oppose subordination along all axes" sends signals of kinship to
some, but it cannot possibly persuade fence-sitters because it is just political cant. It has meaning only
to those who already know the political litany of -the axes or groups actually covered. I suspect that the
authors would approve discrimination against murderers and pedophiles in the form of jail terms
imposed on their actions but not others'.
104. See supra Parts IA-B.
105. Six years ago I hosted a visiting Russian attorney, and wishing to show her that not all of the
District of Columbia was like the swanky midtown area where she worked, I took her to Anacostia to
show her some federally subsidized housing projects in one of the most economically depressed parts
of the city. "How many families live in each apartment?" she asked. When I answered "one," she
asked how many families share each kitchen. After I tried again to show her the difficulties I perceived
for the residents, she brushed me away. "What privileged people these are," she said. Her parents, both
engineers, shared a two-room apartment with her; two neighboring families joined them in sharing a
kitchen, and all of them thought of themselves as privileged within the Russian context where many
families with less important jobs still waited for apartments as grand as theirs.
106. THE NEW COLOR LNE, supra note 1, at iii, dust jacket.
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University of Pennsylvania and Georgetown University Law Center'07 ). Their
discussion of the ideals of the American meritocracy appear not only romanti-
cized, but also focused like tunnel vision on the single issue of privilege for
minorities. A wider perspective would note at least two issues. First, the
American meritocracy, if not outright exclusionary of blacks, is at least inclu-
sive of only the relatively privileged in American society; it is not a meritocracy
(when it is a meritocracy) of all comers. One does not get to compete for
powerful and interesting jobs unless one is born within a zone of privilege that
makes it possible to go to college, get an advanced degree, and impress others
within similar backgrounds. 0 8 An undesirable sliding scale is at work: one's
chances to participate decline the further away one is from the privileged zone,
and though this distance may be offset by personal hard work, it takes more
hard work the further one is away from the most privileged part of the zone.
Second, the American meritocratic ideal is subject to many exceptions, of which
affirmative action is only one. The university legacy about which Lawrence and
Matsuda write is one important exception,' 09 but many more could be cited.
Law professors arrange for friends to be hired, even when not highly meritori-
ous, t0 incumbents in law firms hire those who are similar to themselves,"' and
supervisors hire their brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law (regardless of merit). " 2
To complain about the privilege of affirmative action is to pick out one target in
a very crowded field.11 3 The authors' point can only be that this is the most
egregious or objectionable privilege, but there is little or no discussion of this
point and no comparative data to prove it.
The authors of We Won't Go Back share an equal inability to see themselves
as privileged, very privileged. Lawrence attended "a fashionable and progres-
sive" private school while his parents were in "graduate and professional
107. Id. at iv-vi.
108. Cf WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 185 (discussing how the college admissions process
tends to re-create the elite). I would say that the college admissions process at least gives the current
elite power to create (or influence creation of) the future elite. Cf THE NEW COLOR LtNE, supra note 1,
at 139-40 (stating that accrediting authorities influence admissions to create desired future elite).
109. WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 91-101.
110. See Tushnet, supra note 29, at 1521 (discussing coalitions that might be formed to promote
hiring of his political group). The politicking that goes on in faculty hiring is not limited to crits. As I
once remarked to a friend, I am not completely convinced that Critical Legal Studies correctly predicts
the behavior of most judges, but I am certain that it accurately describes the hiring actions of many
faculties of law.
111. See WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 101. What Lawrence and Matsuda say is equally true
of faculties and admissions. See id. at 105-06.
112. Id. at 109. It is somewhat mystifying that Lawrence and Matsuda do not oppose nepotism
(except when it adversely impacts those whom they wish to protect) given their opposition to privilege.
113. To be fair to Roberts and Stratton, their thesis is not merely that quotas harm our society, but, in
the words of their subtitle, "How Quotas and Privilege Destroy America" (emphasis in original). At
least some of the book concerns how other privileges, such as those exercised by the Supreme Court or
federal bureaucrats, also destroy democratic institutions. But as I discuss below, their focus on
democracy as a vehicle for promoting meritocracy attaches a magical quality to democracy that is
unwarranted. Democracy is that form of government in which all the people get what a majority of the voters
deserve, as the citizens of the District of Columbia and some other nonfunctional cities are well aware.
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school," and the private education allowed him to "escape the substandard
schooling in our neighborhood public school, where the vast majority of the
students were Black and poor." 114 Matsuda's family was also able to choose to
move away from a culturally diverse area of Los Angeles in order to obtain
"safer schools" and a "better life."" 5 Both authors received extensive graduate
educations and have taught at some of the nation's most prestigious schools."1 6
In a single sentence, the authors note that perhaps middle-class persons of color
enjoy a "moderate level of privilege," 117 but virtually every other page argues
that persons opposite themselves are the truly privileged." 18
My point is not that these authors are evil and narrow-minded people, quite
the opposite. What we see in these works of "advocacy scholarship" is that
even persons of generous good nature can become so convinced of the correct-
ness of their positions that they fail to treat others with the same respect they insist
must be accorded to themselves. These authors' worlds are dominated by their topics.
For Roberts and Stratton, democracy and equality are so important that they crowd
out all other considerations;" 9 for Lawrence and especially Matsuda, "antisubordina-
tion" is all-consuming. 120 In the field of "advocacy scholarship" there is often
no room for a well-meaning opponent on the opposite side, much less for a
range of options merely different from what the advocate-scholars propose.12
III. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
Having discussed the limits of advocacy books, I now turn my attention to
what is advocated in these books. As I have noted earlier, their accomplishments
are substantial. The problem for me is not what these books do, but how far they
wish to go in doing it. Their reach toward solutions necessarily causes conflict,
but conflict is normal. This, however, is intractable conflict.
A. REFORMS THAT BEGET NEW PROBLEMS
Having identified their social ills, these authors move aggressively with
remedies. Roberts and Stratton have discovered that firefighters spray water on
114. WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 139-40.
115. Id. at xi.
116. See id. at xiii, 92; see also supra note 10.
117. WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 182 (referring to privilege associated with affirmative
action).
118. It is somewhat ironic here that though three of these authors are my colleagues at Georgetown
University Law Center, only the authors of We Won't Go Back are privileged tenured full professors.
Stratton serves as a non-tenure-track adjunct professor while working for a small nonprofit organiza-
tion. Cf THE NEW COLOR LINE, supra note 1, dustjacket; supa note 10.
119. See THE NEW COLOR LINE, supra note 1, at 13-14.
120. See WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 186, 251, 261.
121. If the authors of The New Color Line are really serious about democracy, how would they
respond to a landowner's claim of expropriation of property? See infra note 135 and accompanying
text. For a sampling of vilified alternative views in We Won't Go Back, consider those of liberal
Democratic Party leader Hubert Humphrey, WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 15, and iconoclastic
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, id. at 47.
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burning houses and that this often causes even more damage to the blazing
structure than the fire itself; they wish to ban all firefighting. Lawrence and
Matsuda have discovered that firefighters save some houses that would other-
wise burn to the ground; they now want to flood every house on the block. In
other words, each has done a creditable job of identifying a major social
problem that threatens our society, but both offer cures that work only in the
context of the narrowly focused worlds that they press on the reader. In the three
subsections that follow, I try to confront three major issues of remedy raised by
these books, and suggest that there are alternatives available that go underappre-
ciated in these pieces of advocacy scholarship.
1. Banning Quotas Versus Socializing the Costs of Affirmative Action
The New Color Line works dramatically well in publicizing some issues that
are discussed only in academic circles, and even seldom raised there.1 22 In
addition, the authors show how antidemocratic "leadership" of the elite classes
can create, as well as solve, problems. Although it is difficult to prove their
major assumption-that American society would have abolished the vestiges of
slavery and racial discrimination through democratic means12 3 -it is an argu-
ment that is widely circulated in this and related fields. 124 Nevertheless, their
ultimate position against affirmative action would proscribe virtually all effec-
tive democratic solutions to the problem of racial discrimination, except prophy-
lactic future rules of color blindness, because any directed assistance would be
unequal treatment. There is something strange and false about an argument that
makes it most difficult for a democracy to solve its most vexing problem.
As a matter of social policy, something more is necessary to solve our
problems related to race than simply banning all future racial discrimination.
Whether one uses the parable of the milk-drinking fox and stork125 or the image
of a shackled runner,1 26 there is in American constitutional democracy some-
thing unseemly about leaving wrongs unrighted. 127 This is also the constitu-
tional assumption in the Reconstruction Amendments. The drafters of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments envisioned that curative
legislation would be necessary,' 28 and contemporaneous Congresses passed
122. See supra text accompanying note 22 (recounting Justice Frankfurter's role in the Brown case).
123. THE NEW COLOR LINE, supra note 1, at 30-31.
124. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 157 (1991) (expressing doubts about a democratic solution); cf Mary E. Becker, Prince
Channing: Abstract Equality, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 201 (questioning whether judicial rules can create
sex equality).
125. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (alluding to the fabled inequality
inherent in offering a bowl of milk to a fox and a stork).
126. See WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 24 (quoting President Lyndon B. Johnson's famous
1967 Howard University speech).
127. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("The very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever
he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.").
128. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; id. at amend. XIV, § 5; id. at amend. XV, § 2. For purposes of the
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legislation manifesting their understanding that the Amendments entitled them
to take affirmative measures that helped former slaves or victims of the former
slave system. 29 The notion that Congress has power to adopt only prohibitory
legislation restating the negative phrasing of the Reconstruction Amendments
has literally zero judicial support.130 Yet under the thesis put forward in The
New Color Line, any compensatory "privilege" bestowed on blacks would be
objectionable, whether school tuition vouchers, scholarships, job-training pro-
grams, housing subsidies, or any other racially directed subsidies. The legisla-
ture would be permitted to address directly lesser problems (discrimination
against the poor, for example, a much more fluid group in American society),
but not the more serious, long-lasting problem of racial discrimination.
1 31
The problem, then, is this: how can one be obedient to both the constitutional
textual provisions banning unequal treatment of individuals, and to those grant-
ing government the authority to remedy problems of racial discrimination in an
affirmative, remedial manner? 32 In social policy terms, is there a mechanism
succeeding discussion, I assume that, as with federal jurisdiction under Article 1mI and some federal
legislative power under Article I, Section 8, these remedial powers are not exclusive. Cf Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that constitutional analysis for affirmative
action plans is same regardless of whether plan is sponsored by federal or state governments).
129. See KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-77, at 99-114 (Bantam ed. 1967)
(discussing Republican radicals in Congress, their legislative successes, and their rejection of President
Andrew Johnson's narrow view of congressional power to help freed slaves); id. at 119-54 (describing
politics and legislation of Radical Reconstruction). Even the Supreme Court decisions that struck down
civil rights legislation in the post-war period assumed that other legislation, more than merely
declaratory of the constitutional text, would be constitutionally permissible. See, e.g., The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 14 (1883) (holding legislation "corrective of any constitutional wrong" is assumed
to be permissible). This rubric of permitting congressional legislation that goes beyond the prohibitory
terms of the Reconstruction Amendments is orthodox constitutional law today even among conserva-
tives. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2170 (1997) (holding Religious Freedom
Restoration Act unconstitutional because not remedial of a Fourteenth Amendment violation, but citing
with approval precedents establishing remedial power of Congress to adopt affirmative remedies
exceeding their prohibitory terms).
130. When the argument was last made by a party in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966), it was rejected by both majority and dissent alike. Id. at 327 (stating majority's rejection); id. at
355 (stating dissent's rejection).
131. Another way of conceiving this issue would be to say that the Roberts-Stratton thesis would
permit racial problems to be solved, but only indirectly by solving problems of poverty generally. This
formulation reveals still further problems. First, the generality of the solution dissipates the resources
that would otherwise be targeted on the more serious problem, racial discrimination. Second, racial
problems do not correlate only with poverty, as rich blacks also suffer racial discrimination, so the
indirection leaves part of the most serious problem unsolved. Third, and distastefully for social
conservatives, see supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text (noting intellectual link between affirma-
tive action and Marxism), by inducing an indirect focus on general poverty, Congress would be forced
to adopt a massively wider redistribution of societal resources than would be necessary through racially
specific affirmative action programs. Of course, the greater the number of topics controlled by an
affirmative action agenda, the less valid is my third point. Cf supra notes 47, 56-60 and accompanying
text (discussing breadth of Lawrence-Matsuda affirmative action recommendations).
132. A creative argument, implicit in some of the arguments made by Roberts and Stratton, might
posit that the enforcement sections of the Reconstruction Amendments have become unconstitutional
over time, that is, that there is no longer a factual predicate extant that would permit the affirmative
assertion of targeted, blacks-only remedial power and that, therefore, the only still-operative compo-
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:377
for reconciling the need to cure past problems of racism while also taking
account of the expectational interests of those who fear quotas? Conceptually,
there is a solution, and that is to socialize broadly the affirmative relief that is
granted. As Roberts and Stratton note, there is a substantial reaction against
affirmative action among those not benefitted, 133 and as Lawrence and Matsuda
note, this may be a recognizable response to the sense of individual financial
loss and economic insecurity that results from potential loss of jobs or other
government benefits. 134 This suggests that opposition is based on a reaction
against the unfair personalizing of costs that should be spread more widely and
absorbed as general social costs. The same balancing of interests occurs under
the Supreme Court's Takings Clause 35 precedents. When an elderly hardware
store owner must give up her land to build a bike trail for privileged suburban
bikers, the store owner, privileged though she may be, may rightly object that
the government is forcing her to bear burdens that should be born by the
collective. 136 Similarly, workers who lose their individual jobs and livelihood to
remedy societal discrimination object that they have been singled out to pay a
cost that all of society should pay. 137 My point is that there are balancing
mechanisms, no less difficult to implement than others favored by conserva-
nents of the Amendments are their general nondiscrimination commands. Cf THE NEW COLOR LINE,
supra note 1, at 163 (discussing that many issues in modem American society transcend race); WE
WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 67-87 (acknowledging argument that racial discrimination no longer
exists, but calling it "The Big Lie"). The issue raised by this creative argument has analogues in other
areas of constitutional law, see, e.g., Woods v. Miller, 333 U.S. 138, 143 (1948) (noting Hamilton ruling
might create extra federal power "for years and years" while such post-war effects were felt and
alluding to this as creating a potential for "abuse[]" and evasion of "constitutional responsibilities");
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 158 (1919) (noting that Congress's
War Power includes power to deal with post-war problems traceable to war, but not treating issue of
time limit for such power). For me, on the issue of race the creative argument fails because it is
demonstrable that current racial problems are traceable to our legacy of slavery and segregation. Cf
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (discussing legacy of poor schools). On other
topics of discrimination, the record might be different. Cf City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157,
2168-70 (1997) (discussing lack of current pervasive problem of religious discrimination disentitles
Congress to adopt affirmative legislation protective of religious adherents but not nonbelievers).
133. See THE NEW COLOR LINE, supra note 1, at 2-4, 171-77.
134. See WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 57.
135. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation").
136. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) ("One of the principal purposes of the
Takings Clause is 'to bar government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens that, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' "(citation omitted)).
137. The analogy between affirmative action and Takings Clause cases may be even more substantial
than I have suggested in the text. Quotas have been criticized in part because the persons whose
interests are adversely affected are often politically powerless whites. Privileged white parents may
support affirmative action in education, for example, safe in the knowledge that the losers will be poor
whites and that their children will continue to gain selective admission. Cf WE WON'T Go BACK, supra
note 2, at 52-53 ("real winners" in affirmative action programs at elite colleges are "the country's
economically and educationally privileged"); see also MARK V. TuSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL
STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at 12 (1987) (suggesting that the Brown
decision was a triumph by one subset of whites over another regional subset). Socializing the costs of
affirmative action therefore imposes its costs, as in Takings Clause cases, on all members of society.
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tives, 138 that foster a less single-minded solution to problems of racial discrimi-
nation. 1
39
2. Politicizing Affirmative Action by Creating a Big Tent
The single-mindedness of We Won't Go Back creates problems for itself
because the authors take its thesis-there are many inequalities in American
society that must be remedied-to its logical conclusion: quotas for everyone
they favor (except gays and lesbians, about whom the authors are unsure and
would defer judgment). It is not simply the breadth of the proposal that is
problematical, it is how Lawrence and Matsuda envision the implementation of
their regime. In a nostalgic review of their days in California, the authors speak
warmly of memories of blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and others gathering in
caucuses to divide the places that would be allotted to each group's members:
At the University of San Francisco Law School, Asian students argued among
themselves about whether the social position of a third-generation Japanese
American from Hawaii was sufficiently different from that of a second-
generation Chinese American from rural California to merit different treat-
ment in the school's affirmative action program. Those same students left their
Asian caucus to make the case to other students of color why Asians should
receive any affirmative action consideration at all, which required educating
colleagues about institutionalized racism and violence against Asians. At the
University of California, Los Angeles, Asian students made this case to
African-American students, and twenty-five years later their voices crack with
138. A principle of maximum socialization, as with all abstract principles, might be difficult for
legislatures and courts to implement, as shown by analogous cases under the Takings Clause. See Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (explaining difficulty in deciding which costs
are individual and which should be socialized). But cf Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747,
791 (1976) (stating cost-socializing rightful-place seniority, which does not oust white incumbents from
jobs to replace them with black discriminatees, correctly balances interests of incumbents and discrimi-
natees). As I suggested in a brief comment 20 years ago, when I last ran the risk of entering this debate,
the line between what is personal and objectionable, and what is general and acceptable, is not a clear
one. In fact, the key to the process may well be merely submerging the cost as deeply as possible to
make it more general, more shared. See Charles F. Abernathy, Affirmative Action and the Rule of Bakke,
64 A.B.A. J. 1233 (1978). In any event, I do not offer this approach as an answer so much as an
alternative, respectable to conservatives, that would validate both the prohibitory text of the Fourteenth
Amendment (as supported by Roberts and Stratton) as well as that Amendment's creation of a remedial
power over racial problems. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
139. There is no certainty that broadly socializing the costs associated with affirmative action would
placate its foes. See, e.g., Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 161 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding scholarships
targeted for blacks and paid from state treasury are unconstitutional, applying same constitutional test
applicable to other affirmative action). There is some irony here, however. The plaintiff in Podberesky
cannot conceive of scholarships for blacks as an extra effort paid by all of society (a socialized cost)
because he has already begun to think of scholarships as an entitlement for himself, a social benefit.
The social state ironically makes further socialization for racial solutions less acceptable because so
many people see themselves as competitively reliant on the social state. Any change on this point would
require alteration of some basic liberal principles of constitutional law. Cf William W. Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968)
(documenting declining success of arguments based on governmental discretion to award its largess).
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emotion as they describe how their Black colleagues were moved to give up
places set aside for Blacks in order to include Asian Americans in affirmative
action at UCLA. This process-the lifelong alliances formed and the under-
standing gained-was more important than the outcome.
Figuring out whom to include, in what numbers, according to what criteria,
at what cost, are institutional decisions that must take into account many
factors, including the history of discrimination at that institution, in that local
community, and in the country at large; the present role of the institution in
perpetuating inequality; and the unmet needs of communities traditionally
excluded from that institution. The principle we should choose to guide this
process is antisubordination. 14°
It is the very image of such caucuses that must drive Roberts and Stratton, as
well as many other Americans, into opposition of affirmative action and quotas,
for they can think of nothing worse than to make life a regular meeting of Iowa
caucuses to decide the distribution of social advantages according to race, sex,
disability, poverty, immigrant status, lingual status, and possibly sexual orienta-
tion. It is not just a matter of transaction costs, 14 1 it is a matter of functionality
and fairness. First, this approach to life sets off a competition for most-creative
victim that would make tabloid television programs seem like anthems to
self-confidence. These demeaning rituals14 2 would require persons to reveal
some of the most intimate aspects of their lives to be judged by other persons
largely unknown. 143 Even if the persons to be benefitted could hammer out their
division of seats, there is the precursor question: how was that number of seats
decided and by whom? Because of the scarcity of resources, invariably the
idealized version of horse-trading described above would create competition
among the groups the authors wish to aid. Earlier in their work the authors
describe Professor Lani Guinier's bitterness over her father's rejection from
Harvard because he finished second in a competition for the college's one black
seat. Should the Asian caucus agree that more blacks should enter college and
therefore reduce its quota to one, I suspect that the person who loses admission
140. WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 266.
141. The scene described by Lawrence and Matsuda, however, calls to mind the observation,
variously attributed, that the problem with socialism is that it requires too many late-night meetings.
142. At the very least, individual personalities, or perhaps even culturally inculcated practices of
demeanors, would lead to wide variations in yearly quotas depending upon how freely certain
advocates cried out to be heard by the group. The caucus system itself might therefore operate to
disadvantage certain groups.
143. Unlike American constitutional law, see Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970)
(refusing to invalidate state economic regulations resulting in disparate distributions of funding
according to the size of recipient's family), German constitutional law recognizes affirmative rights to
governmental assistance, and the provision of individualized assistance can occasion governmentally
mandated inquires into what Americans would deem quite personal matters. See DONALD P. KOMMERS,
THE CONSTrrtmONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 335-59 (2d ed. 1997)
(discussing information-gathering statutes, privacy, and transsexual identification, etc.); id. at 348-62
(discussing German abortion rights).
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because of that sensitive decision would not feel much different from Lani
Guinier's father.'44
There is, of course, the argument that in the scenario described in We Won't
Go Back, minorities are at least making the choices for minorities. I doubt the
persuasiveness of this vision. In an earlier section of We Won't Go Back, the
authors tell a story about Micronesian judges to demonstrate the proposition that
costs and remedies must be communally shared. In this story, "[f]ault is
irrelevant" when a young man dies; the owner of the car who struck and killed
the boy, if fortunate, will himself "have a son to work the taro fields of the
family who lost a son," who "will work for them all his days, as part of [the
driver's] apology."' 145 The problem with the caucus-based division of quota
allocations, as with so many exclusionary affirmative action plans, is that
seldom if ever are the administrators disadvantaging themselves; the excluded
person (a prospective unknown future applicant, for example) is always some
unseen "other" person. And that other person, like the unseen son in the tale
from Micronesia, serves out his life-his only life-in the taro fields to which
his father has consigned him.
The tale of the taro field comes easily to Lawrence and Matsuda because they
reject "classical philosophers who ground their ethics in the individual." 146 I
suspect that many Americans reject the justice of this tale, however, because
they treasure the independence of self in American society that gives each
person his freedom to start anew, without being consigned to lesser status to pay
off his father's debts. 147 Lawrence's and Matsuda's parents' sacrificed part of the
social good fight to win better living conditions for their children, 148 and I suspect that
Lawrence and Matsuda would also find a way to keep a child from the taro field.
3. Antisubordination Is Nothing, Everything, or Neither
As I stated above, Roberts and Stratton offer a difficult option when they ask
society to "go cold turkey" on its cognizance of race, leaving in place the
144. See also KOMMERS, supra note 143, at 179-80 (acknowledging split in Chinese-American
community over affirmative action, especially as it limits opportunities for some members).
145. Id. at 232.
146. WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 242. Part of me considers this assertion only cant, for
elsewhere the authors assiduously cultivate the notion of the individual experience and its importance
in shaping social views and law. See, e.g., id. at xix (rejecting blended "voices" because "[o]ur politics
compel" that authors write "in their own voices, from their own subjectivity"); id. at xx (arguing the
"choice of multiple voices is not just style; it is substantive").
147. American law and society may be quite principled in its attention to nuance in such cases, and
hold opinions about them that are not irrelevant to the affirmative action debate. Were a father at fault in
killing another's child, compensation would be due, and the father would pay, perhaps much to the
detriment of his own son who would receive a diminished inheritance. But any unpaid debt would not
be passed to the son. Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220, 223 (1982) (finding state law disentitling
some children of "illegal entrants" to attend public school unconstitutional because such children are
"not accountable" for their parents' act of immigration).
148. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
1997]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
discriminatory structures of the past. The authors of We Won't Go Back, on the
other hand, are quite frank in their view that "antisubordination" is the control-
ling principle, 149 and should lead to expanded and extended affirmative action
and quotas. There is also a third way here. Both teams of authors have focused
(as usual for American lawyers) on what legal rules government should create,
thereby overlooking the power of aggregated private, individual conduct.
Psychologists, sociologists, and others now widely agree that race is a "social
construct." 1 50 In other words, the differences that are presently ascribed to
"race" in America are far more significant than biological evidence can in fact
substantiate. 51 Even the recognizable differences, such as skin color, are them-
selves the product of prior laws and social constructs that inhibited reproductive
interaction along "racial" lines and thus froze into place the current social
construct of race.' 52 The social constructs that created racism, however, may be
dissolving. The geographic divides and resultant insularity that once made
ethnic subgroups a more palpable and genetically significant factor in human
existence 153 are now gone in America. To the extent that culture might divide
groups at times of reproduction,154 that too is increasingly transcendable as
taboos against interracial marriage decline.
A rational, personally focused approach to America's problems of "race"
might call for persons opposed to the existing social construct to live their own
daily lives as though race did not presently exist. Under this approach, an
emphasis on multicultural or biracial identification would actually be a way-
station along the route to less racial intolerance, not a "copout" as Lawrence
suggests. 155 Following this regimen presents some grave problems to less-
evidently biracial "blacks," as well as "whites," who must fight daily against
persistent pressure to stereotype and abuse. But if aggregated on a massive
scale, this approach could be as incrementally successful as affirmative action,
149. WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 28, 101-02, 266. But see supra note 89 (authors leave
term ambiguous and undefined).
150. James M. Jones, Psychological Models of Race: What Have They Been and What Should They
Be? in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN DIVERSITY IN AMERICA 39 (Jacqueline Goodchilds ed.,
1993) (discussing race as a "social concept"); cf WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at ix (stating
"race is complicated" and tied "to time and place").
151. See Jones, supra note 150, at 14-21 (stating more genetic diversity is detectable between
persons within "racial" groups than among members of different groups).
152. IAN F. HANEY-LOPEZ, W=ITr BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUcrON OF RACE 116-25 (1996)
(discussing antimiscegenation laws, immigration-control laws). The same could perhaps be said of
other groups identified as victims of subordination in We Won't Go Back, e.g., Hispanics and lingual
groups.
153. See Jones, supra note 150, at 8 (alluding to biological origins of population groups).
154. See HANEY-LOPEZ, supra note 152, at 117.
155. WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 180. Again, I suggest that Lawrence may have stated his
beliefs more stridently than is warranted. The allusion to multiculturalism as a "copout" is followed by
a vignette that speaks lauditorily of a "multicultural university," id. at 203, and a chapter that appears to
approve of "multiculturalism," id. at 209-28.
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especially if, as stated by the authors of We Won't Go Back, such programs are
often only ruses to benefit elite "whites." 1
56
This personal approach to diminishing the importance of race responds to the
fear that racially conscious affirmative action will perpetuate exactly the "ra-
cial" consciousness at the root of our current dilemma by extending racial
consciousness far into the future. 157 The specter of an America in which there is
a "marching season" to celebrate aggrievements 600 years old, as in Northern
Ireland, or prolonged fighting between mutually, periodically subordinated groups,
as in Bosnia or Israel, is one that might lead a reasonable person to devalue
"antisubordination," "democracy," and other governmentally focused remedies
to our "racial" problems.
B. UNNEGOTIATED SOLUTIONS: WHY PEOPLE DO NOT TALK
Earlier I explained that the sometimes-authoritarian attitude of the Lawrence
and Matsuda book, its dismissive underlying tone, discourages others from
entering the debate because it immediately dismisses their bona fides.' 58 Yet
their work only deepens a silence already in place. Most citizens, excepting
fervent conservatives like Roberts and Stratton, avoid debate or serious discus-
sion of affirmative action and quotas. When there is debate, it is often ineffec-
tive as persuasion, even among persons of goodwill. Let me suggest why the
problems at issue here may be intractable. In doing so, I hope to go beyond the
usual basic issues of self-interest, entitlements gained and lost, and fear of being
publicly branded a racist or general bigot.
1. Subordination and Racial Consciousness
Even as applied to groups of persons rather than individual psyches, subordi-
nation becomes a subjective and illusive concept. Many of the most animated
students in my Civil Rights class come from minority groups that affirmative
action supporters seldom, if ever, include-Jews, Irish-Americans, and Italian-
Americans in particular. 159 These groups suffered widespread discrimination
156. Id. at 52-53.
157. Although the authors of We Won't Go Back give no firm date for ending reparations-linked
affirmative action, they refer to an often-used baseline, the "centuries" during which "white su-
premacy" was built. Id. at 26-27. It would be fair to assume, given this comment, that they would take a
similarly long view of the curative period for affirmative action for sex discrimination and that based on
ethnicity, lingual status, and disability.
158. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
159. We Won't Go Back reflects the prevailing view of these groups among affirmative action
supporters: they are simply "whites." WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 210. Irish-Americans
appear in the text as racists, id. at xi, Jews as childhood friends, id. at xi. A listing of civil rights groups
from the 1960s fails to mention the Anti-Defamation League or any Italian-American groups. Id. at
19-22. Chapter 10, with its listing of groups to be assisted by extending affirmative action, also omits
these groups. See id. at 249-69. One vignette offers a portrait of a "white, Jewish[] male," but it is
decidedly different form the other vignettes: the subject is not a victim who needed affirmative action,
but a professor who benefitted when affirmative action enriched the diversity of his world. Id. at 204.
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themselves until recently, and many of these students have home-and-hearth
stories of deprivation that may rival those of the authors of We Won't Go
Back. 160 Although I tend to agree that visually identifiable ethnic groups have a
much more difficult and lengthy experience escaping discrimination, modem
affirmative action supporters overlook the fact that when these immigrants came
to America, they were also considered non-white or uncivilized, and their
features were thought to be equally distinctive.' 6' Many such students probably
see Lawrence's family life as being particularly financially and socially privi-
leged as compared to their own, and at least among educated persons, they see a
much greater overlap between blacks and their ethnic group than Lawrence and
Matsuda appear to perceive. Any argument that they are privileged falls on deaf
ears-ears as deaf as Lawrence's and Matsuda's must be when it is suggested
that American blacks are materially privileged as compared to Russians. 1
62
Among persons customarily called "whites," there is a similar lack of
sensitivity toward black racial consciousness. A significant number of them,
especially those living and working in areas with few blacks (and in modem
America, that is many whites), are relatively incognizant of their own race, and
this leads them to believe in color-blindness in a way that seems perfectly
normal to Roberts and Stratton, but affected to Lawrence and Matsuda. As
members of the majority who suffer no consequences from their perceived race (aside
from the effects of affirmative action), these persons live lives with significant periods
of inattention to race. Because it is a tangential concern in their lives, they see
consistent racial consciousness as self-accentuated, and thus see the views of "race
men" 163 as being false much as Lawrence and Matsuda deem color-blindness to be.
Given these perceptions of group self-recognition (or non-self-recognition), it
is unsurprising that most self-cognizant groups will tend to make decisions
about justice based on the benefits that their group will realize under any
proposed social reordering. 164 The authors of these two books, therefore, may
have unreconcilable views because they hold vastly different degrees of racial
consciousness and perceive themselves as belonging to different groups; thus,
they perceive any distribution that favors their group as being more "just,"
regardless of other factors. 
165
160. Largely in recognition of our nineteenth-century ancestors' broad definition of race and
wide-spread practice of ethnic discrimination, the Supreme Court has adopted a wider interpretation of
Civil War era civil rights laws to cover such discrimination. See, e.g., St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481
U.S. 604 (1987) (interpreting 1866 Civil Rights Act and discussing discrimination in 1860s).
161. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
163. See WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 68 (describing persons regularly concerned with
remedying racial problems of blacks).
164. See, e.g., Grover, supra note 52, at 248 (collecting the work of psychologists supporting this
proposition).
165. I purposely use "may" in this sentence because some studies actually show that among
Americans, some prefer a method of equal distribution even when it harms their self-perceived group.
See id. (citing studies).
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2. Qualifications and "the Qualified"
There is also the question of qualifications. With Lawrence and Matsuda, it
appears that "qualified" means "minimally qualified" 166 or perhaps even "po-
tentially qualified," 167 and in any event "qualifications" rarely accurately re-
flect ability or merit. 168 Speaking in those terms, it is somewhat easy to
understand why they think that qualifications are less important: they can be
acquired by all persons. It follows that the distribution of societal privileges
should be random and reflect population percentages, so that departures from
such figures immediately raise the specter of racism.' 69 To Roberts and Stratton, on
the other hand, qualifications are based on personal merit and earned by hard work.
With this view, it is difficult to accept any argument that the benefits and privileges of
ability should be distributed at random, whether by lottery 170 or affirmative action.
This relative difference in appreciation of qualifications is an especially
difficult chasm to bridge when the extremes of the distributional range of
qualification are reached. To Roberts and Stratton, Justice Marshall is regarded
as a "fine individual," but just not up to the burdens of his job near or at the top
of the federal judiciary.17 ' Lawrence and Matsuda, on the other hand, treat quite
seriously their own suggestion that music concerts "showcase 'the best' musi-
cians and allow audiences of less-than-best music fans to play along."'
172
Similarly, they seriously suggest that "premier institutions" could invite both
"gifted mathematicians and nuclear physicists" along with "interested nonex-
perts to come to the same [facility] to study and contribute to research at their
own level." 173 This gulf of appreciation for qualifications, even at the extreme
of relevance and need where they might be thought to be most visibly relevant,
makes it unlikely that these persons will speak to each other in a constructive
manner any time soon.
CONCLUSION
I admire the substantial contributions that my colleagues have made to the
affirmative action debate. Their "advocacy scholarship" forcefully makes the
166. See WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 106, 254.
167. See id. at 100.
168. See id. at 99-101.
169. Traditionally, civil rights organizations and leaders have undervalued qualifications because,
whatever they might be, they had been established by the dominant community and were not widely
possessed in minority communities. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971)
(holding that high school diploma requirement as condition for employment adversely affects blacks in
North Carolina in 1960s).
170. Cf. WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 105 (suggesting random distribution of educational
benefits).
171. THE NEW COLOR LINE, supra note 1, at 34 (quoting views of others with apparent endorse-
ment).
172. WE WON'T Go BACK, supra note 2, at 110 (quoting views of others with apparent endorsement).
173. Id. at 120.
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case for their views in a way that will make these books the new leaders of their
genre. Like a first-week, first-year law student who is attracted to a majority
opinion until he reads the dissent, I find attraction in both these irreconcilable
theses. Joining Roberts and Stratton, I believe that reformers should be held to
the same high standards that they demand of others, but joining Lawrence and
Matsuda, I believe that continuing effects of racial discrimination comprise the
most serious social problem of our day.
I also know what I fear. Doing little or nothing, as Stratton and Lawrence
implicitly suggest, leaves wounds to fester. On the other hand, I am unwilling to
send anyone's child to the taro fields: the goal is to liberate each of us from
debilitating classifications, not to reinforce them. Group consciousness, like
alcohol, can be a pleasant little diversion or a serious addiction. It may be too
much, and perhaps not even good, to insist that everyone be a teetotaler, but
nightly drunkenness invites addiction.
